Working Together -- the Institutions of the European Community. European Documentation 1991 by Noël, Emile
Periodical 1991 
WORKING TOGETHER -
THE  INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 
by Emile Noel 
I. 
f  ' '  .. 
.  I 
I 
I 
!  : 
!- ~  r  ..  I 
t  '  I 
I  -.  l  . 
•·  ...  •  ~·  r 
[
.  -~  '  ····.  .  -_ 







*  * 
*  *  •  *  ••• 
EUROPEAN  DOCUMENTATION Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992 
ISBN 92-826-3405-1 
Catalogue number: CM-72-91-455-EN-C 
<9  ECSC-EEC-EAEC,  Brussels  • Luxembourg,  1991 
Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. 
Printed in Germany WORKING  TOGETHER -
THE  INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 
by Emile Noel, 
President of the European University, Florence 
Manuscript completed in  1988 
New edition 1991 
Cover:  Eureka Slide, Brussels CONTENTS 
THE  FOUR INSTITUTIONS  5 
lJ HOW DO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION  DISCHARGE THEIR 
DUTIES  UNDER THE  PARIS AND  ROME TREATIES?  [Zj 
1J FINANCING THE COMMUNITY  0 
THE COMMISSION  11 
1J THE COMMISSION  AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE TREATIES  [ill 
1J THE COMMISSION  AS THE  EXECUTIVE ARM  @J 
1J THE COMMISSION  INITIATES COMMUNITY POLICY AND  DEFENDS THE 
COMMUNITY  INTEREST.  IT  SEES TO  IT THAT COMMUNITY  POLICY 
FORMS A CONSISTENT WHOLE  [_0 
THE COMMISSION-COUNCIL DIALOGUE  20 
1J UNANIMITY AND MAJORITY  0J 
1J THE  EUROPEAN COUNCIL  ~ 
D THE COUNCIL  PRESIDENCY  IE 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  26 
1J A DIRECTLY  ELECTED  PARLIAMENT  ~ 
1J THE  ROLE AND  FUNCTIONING OF PARLIAMENT  ~ 
1J BUDGETARY  POWERS  ~ 
1J LEGISLATIVE POWERS  ~ 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE  32 
THE  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE  34 
THE COURT OF AUDITORS  35 WORKING METHODS  36 
D THE COMMISSION'S DEPARTMENTS  ~ 
[] HOW THE COMMISSION  WORKS  ~ 
0  HOW THE COMMISSION  REACHES  ITS  DECISIONS AND  DRAWS  UP 
PROPOSALS  FOR SUBMISSION TO THE COUNCIL  [Ej 
0  THE COUNCIL  IN OPERATION  ~ 
I would like to extend my thanks to Mr  Hartmut Offe/e, Adviser in the Secretariat-General of  the 
Commission of  the European Communities, who helped produce this updated edition. THE  FOUR INSTITUTIONS 
The institutional system of  the European Communities is difficult to classify. The Community 
is much more than an intergovernmental organization: it has its own special legal status and 
extensive powers of its own. But the Community is not a true federation to which national 
parliaments and governments are subordinate in the areas reserved to it. Our best course may 
be to leave it to future historians to find an appropriate label and simply describe it  as a 'Com-
munity' system. 
The task of achieving the aims of the three 
Communities-the European Coal and Steel 
Community(ECSC) (established in 1952), the 
European  Economic  Community  (EEC) 
(1958)  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community (Euratom)  (1958)  - rests  with 
four institutions:  the  European  Parliament, 
the Council, the Commission and the Court 
of  Justice, with the support of the Economic 
and  Social  Committee  and  the  Court  of 
Auditors. 
Until July 1967 the three Communities had 
separate  Councils  and  executive  Commis-
sions (known as the 'High Authority' in the 
ECSC). But since then there has been a single 
Commission and a single Council, which ex-
ercise  all  the  powers  and  responsibilities 
rested in their respective predecessors by the 
three Community Treaties.  By contrast, the 
European Parliament and the Court of  Justice 
have  been  common  to  the  three  Com-
munities since 1958. 
The mergerofthe institutions was seen as the 
first step  towards  setting up a single Euro-
pean Community to be governed by a single 
Treaty,  replacing  the  Paris  Treaty 
(establishing the ECSC) and the Rome Treaty 
(establishing the EEC and Euratom). 
But this idea was not followed through at the 
time; nor  was it  taken up again in the negotia-
tions on the Single Act in 1985. 
The  successive  enlargements  of  the 
Communities
1 -with the accession of the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and  Denmark on 
1 January  1973,  Greece on 1 January 1981, 
and  most  recently  Spain  and  Portugal  on 
1 January 1986-have not affected the basic 
structure or  responsibilities of  the Communi-
ty  institutions  although  their composition 
has altered. 
The Single European Act (which was signed 
in February 1986 and entered into force on 
1 July 1987) has extended the Community's 
field  of  competence  and  brought  about 
significant changes in relations between the 
institutions and  in  their operating  rules.  It 
also  gave  formal  legal  status  to  European 
Political  Cooperation,  which  has  been 
operating since 1970 simply on the basis of 
intergovernmental agreements. 
The European Parliament has been elected 
by direct universal suffrage since 1979. It has 
518  members; the breakdown of seats  is  as 
follows:  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  the 
United Kingdom:  81  each;  Spain:  60; The 
Netherlands: 25; Belgium, Greece and Por-
tugal:  24  each;  Denmark:  16;  Ireland:  15; 
Luxembourg: 6. 
The Council is made up of representatives of 
the  governments of the  12  Member States. 
Each  government normally sends one of its 
ministers.  Its  membership thus  varies  with 
the  subjects  down  for  discussion.  The 
Foreign Minister is regarded as his country's 
'main'  representative  in  the  Council,  but 
Ministers  for  Agriculture,  Transport, 
Economic and  Financial  Affairs,  Social  Af-
fairs,  Industry,  the  Environment and  so  on 
also meet frequently for specialized Council 
meetings  and  sometimes  sit alongside the 
Foreign Ministers. 
'  The  original Member States  were  Belgium, 
France, the Federal Republic of  Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and The Netherlands. At their December 1974 Summit, the Heads 
of  State (for France) or Government agreed to 
meet regularly together with the President of 
the Commission as the 'European Council', 
accompanied by their Foreign Ministers. The 
European Council meets both as the Council 
of  the Communities {to deal with Communi-
ty  matters)  and  as  a  forum  for  political 
cooperation. Until 1985 it met three times a 
year,  but since 1986.it normally meets only 
twice a year. 
The  Presidency of the  Council  rotates  be-
tween  the  member  ·governments  at  six-
monthly intervals. When decisions are taken 
in the Council by majority vote. France, Ger-
many, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 
votes  each,  Spain  has  eight,  Belgium, 
Greece, The Netherlands and  Portugal five 
each,  Denmark and Ireland three each and 
Luxembourg two. 
A qualified majority means 54 votes out of a 
total of 76. 
The  Council  is  assisted  by  a  Permanent 
Representatives  Committee  which  com-
prises  the  Permanent  Representatives  (am-
bassadors) of  the Member States to the Com-
munities.  Its  main  task  is  to  prepare  the 
ground  for  Council  meetings.  A  large 
number of  working parties operate under its 
authority. 
The  Commission  consists  of 17  Members, 
appointed  by  agreement  between  the 
member  governments.  Throughout  their 
four-year term  of office Members must re-
main independent of  the governments and of  · 
the Council. The Council cannot remove any 
Member from  office.  Parliament,  however, 
can pass a motion of  censure compelling the 
Commission to resign  as  a body (in  which 
case,  it would continue to handle everyday 
business until its replacement). 
The Court of  justice, composed of 13 judges 
appointed for six years by agreement among 
the governments, ensures that implementa-
tion of the Treaties is in accordance with the 
rule of  law. The judges are assisted by six ad-
vocates-general. An additional Court of  First 
Instance was set up in 1989. 
In EEC and Euratom matters, the Council and 
the  Commission  are  assisted  by  the 
Economic and Social Committee. This con-
sists  of 189  members,  representing various 
sectors of  economic and sociallife.lt must be 
consulted  before decisions are  taken  on  a 
large number of subjects, and is also free to 
submit opinions on its own initiative. 
In ECSC matters, the Commission is assisted 
by a Consultative Committee, which has 96 
members representing producers, workers, 
consumers and dealers in the coal and steel 
industries.  It too must be consulted before 
decisions are taken on a large number of  sub-
jects and  it can  also submit opinions on its 
own initiative. 
Through the Economic and Social Commit-
tee  and  the  Consultative  Commitee,  the 
various interest groups concerned are active-
ly involved in the development of the Com-
munity. 
The Court of Auditors has  12 members ap-
pointed by unanimous decision of  the Coun-
cil  after  consulting  Parliament.  It  began 
operating in October 1977.  It audits the ac-
counts of  the Community and of  Community 
bodies, examines whether revenue and ex-
penditure have been  properly and  lawfully 
received and incurred, checks that financial 
management has  been  sound,  and  reports 
back to the Community institutions. 
With the unification of Germany on 3 Oc-
tober 1990, the Community was enlarged to 
include the territory of the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and Communi-
ty legislation came into force there subject to 
various  temporary derogations.  Germany's 
representation in the various Community in-
stitutions remains unchanged. D HOW DO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE COMMISSION 
DISCHARGE THEIR  DUTIES 
UNDER THE  PARIS AND 
ROME TREATIES? 
When acting under the Paris Treaty (ECSC), 
the Commission  can  take  decisions,  make 
recommendations or issue opinions.  Deci-
sions  are  binding  in  their entirety;  recom-
mendations are binding as to the ends but 
not  as  to  the  means;  opinions  are  not 
binding. 
The Council acts in ECSC affairs mainly atthe 
request of the Commission, either stating its 
opinion on particular issues or giving the as-
sent without which,  in  certain  matters,  the 
Commission cannot proceed. 
The Commission's ECSC decisions are most-
ly addressed to individual persons, firms or 
governments  but  they  may  also  lay  down 
general  rules,  since the Commission  does 
also have general rule-making powers. 
When acting under the Rome Treaties (EEC 
and Euratom), the Council and Commission 
issue  regulations,  directives,  decisions, 
recommendations  and  opinions.  Regula-
tions  are  of  general  application:  they  are 
binding in their entirety and applicable in all 
Member States. Directives are binding on the 
Member States to which they are addressed 
as regards the result to be achieved, but leave 
the form and methods of achieving it to the 
discretion of the national authorities.  Deci-
sions may be addressed to a government, an 
enterprise or a private  individual; they are 
binding in their entirety on those to whom 
they are addressed.  Recommendations and 
opinions are not binding. 
The discrepancy in terminology between the 
Paris and the two Rome Treaties  is  perhaps 
confusing.  An  ECSC  recommendation  is  a 
binding enactment corresponding to the EEC 
and  Euratom  directive,  whereas  an  EEC 
recommendation  is  not  binding and  is  no 
stronger than an opinion. 
The Commission is the driving force behind 
the ECSC (though the Council's role in con-
nection  with  issues  of  special  importance 
must not be underrated). Under the EEC and 
Euratom Treaties, on the other hand, we have 
what is perhaps the most novel feature of the 
whole  institutional  system,  with  the  Com-
mission  and  the  Council  operating  in 
tandem to provide the motive power.  Here 
the  Commission  derives  the  political authority that is essential for it to fulfil its role 
vis-a-vis the Counci.l  from  the fact that it  is 
answerable to Parliament alone. With the en-
try  into  force  of the  Single  European  Act, 
Parliament is  now more closely involved  in 
the  Community's.  legislative  process, 
through what is  known as the 'cooperation 
procedure'.  · 
In  the three Communities  (ECSC,  EEC  and 
Euratom),  the Court 'of justice not only af-
fords the Member States and individuals the 
assurance that the Treaties and the legislation 
implementing them  will  be fully  complied 
with, but also plays a notable part in ensuring 
uniform  interpretation and  enforcement of 





From the very outset in 1952 (with the ECSC), 
the  Community  has  been  provided  with 
funds  not  only  for  its  own  administrative 
working  but  also  to  finance  a  variety  of 
operations. It has also been very active in bor-
rowing  and  lending.  Both  the  budget and 
other  financial  operations  have  increased 
considerably over the years. 
The ECSC is financed in a rather novel way-
by a levy on the value of coal and steel pro-
duction,  paid  direct to  the  High  Authority 
. (now the Commission)  by the various  pro-
ducers. The EEC and Euratom, on the other 
hand, were originally financed by contribu-
tions from the Member States.  But with the 
completion of the customs union and the in-
troduction of a common agricultural policy 
financed entirely on a Community basis, the 
Heads of State and/or Government, meeting 
in December 1969 in The Hague, decided to 
set up  a system  for  the Communities' own 
resources, as foreseen in the Treaties, which 
would meet all the requirements of the EEC 
and  Euratom.  This  own  resources  system 
would exist alongside the ECSC system. 
The new system was adopted by the Council 
in  April  1970  and,  after  ratification  by the 
Parliaments  of  the  six  founder  Member 
States,  was  gradually  introduced  from  the 
beginning of 1971. 
The  Community's  own  resources  consist 
primarily of levies on imports of agricultural 
produce  and  customs  duties  collected  at 
Community borders, plus certain other taxes 
introduced under the common agricultural 
policy.  The  1970 decision also assigned  to 
the Community part of the value-added tax 
(VAn collected in the Member States up to a 
maxi mum of 1% of the tax base. Owing to the 
growth of the Community's budget, the full 
amount  of  available  own  resources  was 
called up in  1984 (and even  had to be sup-
plemented  by advances  from  the  Member 
States). 
In  1988,  after  lengthy  discussions  and  the 
adoption of transitional measures in 1984, an 
overall financial  reform was decided on, on 
the Commission's initiative, and entered into 
force on  1 January 1989.  It guaranteed that 
the Community would receive the resources 
necessary to carry out its activities up to the 
end of  1992  (including the full  implemen-
tation  of the Single  European  Act)  and  in-
corporated the following novel features: 
(i) the ceiling for own resources was set at a 
percentage of the Community's GNP,  rang-
ing from 1.15% in 1988 to 1.2% in 1992 (pay-
ment appropriations); 
(ii) a proportion of 1.4% of VAT collected in 
the Member States was allocated to the Com-
munity (subject to a correction to allow for 
disparities  in  the  structures  of  their 
economies); 
(iii)  a new 'fourth  resource' was  instituted, 
based on the GNP of the Member States, to 
ensure that the amount of resources paid by 
each Member State is more closely related to 
its ability to pay; 
(iv) customs duties on ECSC products would 
from  now on be part of own resources. 
The following figures will give some idea of 
the size of the budget and the various sources 
of revenue. The 1990 budget totalled ECU 46 700 million 
1
, (appropriations for payments). 
Financing came from ECU  2 300 million in 
levies and other agricultural revenue (4.9%), 
ECU  11  300  million  in  customs  duties 
(24.2%), ECU 28 200 million in VAT (60%), 
and  ECU  2  000 million under the 'fourth 
resource' (4.3%), the remainder being made 
up of miscellaneous revenue. 
The  ECSC  operating budget  is  far  smaller; 
ECU 435 million in 1990, of which ECU  172 
mi II ion came from the ECSC levy (at a current 
rate of0.31%) and the rest from interest on in-
vestments and loans made from  ECSC own 
resources. 
Details about the main chapters of  the Com-
munity budget are given below. 
The British contribution to the 
Community budget 
During the accession negotiations in 1970-71 
the  United Kingdom  had  claimed that ap-
plication  of  the  own  resources  system 
established by the Six would produce an un-
balanced situation in which it would be the 
loser.  The  Accession  Treaty  laid  down 
lengthy transitional  measures.  Moreover,  it 
had  been  agreed  during  the  accession 
negotiations that if a Member State  found 
itself in an unacceptable position, the Com-
munity should take appropriate measures. 
In  1979  the British Government, citing this 
agreement,  asked  for  special  measures  to 
replace the transitional  provisions expiring 
that year. 
Although the other Member States and  the 
Commission disputed the basis of  the British 
calculation (since own resources cannot be 
viewed  as  State  contributions),  they 
recognized  that  the  situation  was  unjust, 
mainly because  British agriculture receives 
very  little  cash  under  the  common 
agricultural policy. 
After some hard bargaining, the principle of 
financial compensation was accepted and a 
fixed  system  was  adopted  at  the  Fon-
tainebleau European Council in June  1984. 
This arrangement was confirmed and geared 
to the new system of  own resources in 1988. 
There are complex rules for calculating the 
amount of 'compensation'  and  the  cost  is 
borne by the other 11  Member States in pro-
portion to their GNP, with reductions being 
granted to Germany (and to Spain and Por-
tugal up to the end of  their transitional period 
in  1991). 
In  1990 the United Kingdom received com-
pensation of ECU 2 430 million for the 1989 
financial year. 
Community  borrowing  and  lending 
operations 
The Community carries out borrowing and 
lending operations under the ECSC, EEC and 
Euratom Treaties. It also has its own banking 
institution  for  long-term  financing  - the 
European  Investment Bank,  established  by 
the Treaty of Rome.  The Community's bor-
rowing  and  lending  has  expanded  con-
siderably overthe years thanks to its excellent 
credit  rating  on  the  international  capital 
markets. 
Most of the  Commission's  ECSC  loans  go 
towards  the  modernization  of mines  and 
steel  plants and  the conversion of areas  af-
1  All  amounts are given in ecus. The ecu (a name 
adopted  by  the  European  Council  in 
December  1978,  deriving from  the abbrevia-
tion for European currency unit and also call-
ing to mind a medieval French coin) is the ac-
counting  unit  of  the  European  Monetary 
System  and in  1981  replaced the accounting 
units previously used for the budget and for the 
accounts of  borrowing  and  lending operations. 
The  ecu  is  made  up  of fixed  amounts  of 
Member States'  currencies.  Its  composition, 
which was first determined in 1979, has subse-
quently been revised with the introduction of 
the Greek drachma, the Spanish peseta and  the 
Portuguese escudo. Its value is calculated daily 
on the basis of  exchange market rates.  ECU  1 
2.10.91  - 42.1890 Belgian/Luxembourg francs; 
7.90285  Danish  kroner;  2.04736  German 
marks;  228.081  Greek  drachmas;  129.520 
Spanish  pesetas;  6.97654  French  francs; 
2.30756  Dutch  guilders;  0.765783  Irish 
pounds;  1531.76  Italian  lira;  176.076  Por-
tuguese  escudos;  0.102940  Pounds  sterling; 
1.23260 US dollars. fected by declining coal or steel production. 
Some of them are eligible for interest relief 
financed  from  the  ECSC  budget.  Between 
1954 and the end of 1989 the High Authority 
(later  the  Commission)  borrowed  and  on-
lenta total of ECU 17.200 million in this way. 
To help Member States overcome balance of 
payments difficulties the EEC has, since 1981, 
been  allowed  to  raise  up  to  ECU  8  000 
million  in  loans  for on-lending.  In  return, 
recipients have to accept a certain measure 
of  economic and monetary discipline. A loan 
of ECU 4 000 million was made to France in 
1983  and  ECU  1  750  million was  lent to 
Greece  in  1985/86.  Measures  of this  type 
were  first  introduced  in  1975,  but  on  a 
smaller scale. 
Another Community borrowing and lending 
scheme is the New Community Instrument 
(NCI), administered jointly by the Commis-
sion  and  the  European  Investment  Bank, 
which  is  designed  to  help  finance  in-
vestments  in  energy,  industry  (especially 
small businesses) and infrastructure. Since its 
launch in 1978 the NCI  has  been extended 
four times, with a total of ECU 6 350 million 
being raised up to the end of 1989. Loans go 
towards projects that are  in line with Com-
munity objectives. 
Besides the NCI, there are also Euratom bor-
rowing and lending operations, under which 
ECU 3 000 million may be raised for projects 
in the field of nuclear energy. 
The  European  Investment  Bank  gives 
guarantees and  loans for a variety of invest-
ment  projects,  mainly  in  industry,  energy 
and  infrastructure.  In  order to  qualify for 
assistance,  projects must promote region<tl 
development or be  of common  interest to 
several Member States or the Community as 
a whole, or they must contribute towards in-
dustrial  modernization  or conversion.  The 
EIB  may  also  grant  loans  to  non-member 
countries with Community authorization. 
The  Bank's capital, which is  subscribed by 
the Member States, amounts to ECU  57 600 
million.  Its  activities  have  increased  con-
siderably  in  recent  years.  Between  its 
establishment in  1958 and  the end of 1989 
the Bank granted loans totalling more than 
ECU 68 000 million from its own resources. 
In  1988 and 1989 alone, loans totalled ECU 
9  600  million  and  ECU  12  000  million 
respectively. Some of its loans are eligible for 
interest relief financed from the Community 
budget. THE COMMISSION 
The Community Treaties assign the Commis-
sion a wide range of  tasks. In broad terms the 
Commission's role is to act as the guardian of 
the Treaties, to serve as the executive arm of 
the  Communities,  to  initiate  Community 
policy,  and  to  defend  the  Community  in-
terest in the Council. 
D THE COMMISSION  AS THE 
GUARDIAN  OF THE TREATIES 
The Commission has to "see to it that the pro-
visions of the Treaties  and  the decisions of 
the  institutions  are  properly  implemented 
and  endeavours  to  maintain  a  climate  of 
mutual confidence. If it performs its watch-
dog  function  properly,  all  concerned  can 
carry out their obligations to the full, secure 
in  the  knowledge  that  their  opposite 
numbers are doing the same and that any in-
fringement  of  the  Treaties  will  be  duly 
penalized. 
Conversely, no party can plead others' failure 
to meet their obligations as a reason for not 
fulfilling its own: if any party is  in breach, it 
is  for  the  Commission,  as  an  impartial 
authority,  to  investigate,  issue  an  objective 
ruling,  and  notify  the  government  con-
cerned, subject to review by the Court, of  the 
action required to put matters in order. 
The ECSC Treaty was the first to require the 
institutions to discipline infringements. But 
the procedure, since it involves governments, 
is complex and cumbersome, and (fortunate-
ly) has seldom been applied. In the light of 
experience  with  the  ECSC,  the  provisions 
written into the Rome Treaties were simpler 
and tougher and, in the case of  the EEC, have 
been quite extensively used. It is these rules 
that are decribed in what follows. 
The Commission investigates a presumed in-
fringement of  the Treaty either on its own in-
itiative or on  the strength  of complaints -
from  governments,  firms  or  private  in-
dividuals.  Such  complaints  are  always  ex-
amined  with  particular care.  Once an  in-
fringement has  been established, the Com-
mission requests the State in question to sub-
mit its comments within a specified period, 
generally  two  months.  This  time-limit  is 
much  shorter  in  the  case  of  serious  in-
fringements  wich  directly affect  the  func-
tioning of the common market. 
If  the Member State allows the disputed prac-
tice to continue and is unable to satisfy the 
Commission,  the  Commission  issues  a 
reasoned  opinion,  which  the  State  must 
comply with before a given deadline. If  it fai Is 
to do so, the Commission may refer the mat-
ter to the Court of  Justice, whose judgment is 
binding on both parties. 
These rules, which give the Commission and 
the  Court considerable  powers,  are  com-
prehensively enforced.ln 1989, for example, 
the Commission instituted infringement pro-
ceedings in 664 cases,  issued  180 reasoned 
opinions and referred 96 cases to the Court. 
As  these  figures  show,  only a very  limited 
number of cases are referred to the Court of 
justice. The majority are settled at an earlier 
stage,  the Member State concerned having 
rectified the situation. 
The  Community  has  stepped  up  its 
legislative activity in the run-up to the single 
market. At the same  time long delays  have 
built up in the implementation of decisions 
once they have been taken; this is especially 
true  of the  incorporation  of  Community 
directives into national law. Around 80% of 
the  infringement proceedings  instituted  in 
1988-89 arose because directives had been 
wrongly incorporated into national law or 
not incorporated at all. The areas where the 
largest  number of infringements occur are 
the internal market, agriculture and the en-
vironment. 
Despite the  high  number of infringements 
against which action has  been taken,  their 
economic significance has been limited. Ex-
cept in a few serious cases, they have tended to  be  not  so  much  deliberate  attempts  to 
evade the Treaty rules as differences in inter-
pretation  between  the  Commission  and 
Member States, and these have been settled 
by the Court. More frequently still, they have 
been  the  result  of delays  in  national  ad-
ministrative or parliamentary procedures or 
the kind of mistake that is bound to crop up 
occasionally  when  national  civil  services 
have  to  adjust  to  Community  procedures. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has been tak-
ing a tougher stance in view of the threat to 
the completion of the Community's internal 
market posed by the delays in incorporating 
directives. As a result the situation gradually 
improved during 1990. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  most  Com-
munity  law  is  directly applicable  (notably 
regulations but other instruments too). This 
means that any individual or firm can invoke 
Community law in a national court or claim 
@  The European Commission 
redress if it  is wrongly applied. This decen-
tralized  monitoring  of  the  application  of 
Community  law  is  gradually  developing 
more  widely,  complementing  the  super-
vision carried out by the Commission. 
[] THE COMMISSION  AS THE 
EXECUTIVE ARM 
The Commission  is directly invested by the 
Treaties with wide executive powers. In addi-
tion, substantial extra powers have been con-
ferred on it by the Council, mostly in the EEC 
context, to secure implementation of legisla-
tion  based on the Treaty (normally termed 
'secondary  legislation').  Under  the  Single 
European  Act,  the  conferring  of  executive 
powers  on  the  Commission  is  now  the 
general rule. 
The  powers  deriving  directly  from  the 
Treaties and those conferred by the Council can  be  subdivided  into  three  broad 
categories. 
1.  Issuing  of decisions  and  regulations 
implementing certain Treaty provisions or 
Council acts 
The ECSC Treaty gives the Commission par-
ticularly  extensive  leg{slative  powers:  its 
function is declared to be 'to ensure that the 
objectives set out in this Treaty are attained', 
i.e.  to  establish  and  operate  a  common 
market in coal and steel. Practically every ar-
ticle invests it with fresh responsibilities and 
corresponding powers. 
The Rome Treaties also give the Commission 
direct legislative powers. This is particularly 
true  of the  EEC  Treaty  in  all  matters  con-
nected with the establishment of a customs 
union  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty 
timetable. But it is above all the powers con-
ferred by the Council in connection with the 
common policies-especially the common 
agricultural policy and the completion of the 
internal  market  - that  have  so  notably 
enlarged the Commission's responsibilities. 
Figures  speak  louder  than  words:  during 
1989 alone, the Commission enacted about 
5 719  regulations,  most of them  relating to 
the common agricultural policy. 
2. Application of  the Tre.1ty rules to specific 
cases (involving governments or firms) 
Here again the Commission was given a par-
ticularly prominent role by the ECSC Treaty; 
it deals direct with coal and steel undertak-
ings and monitors certain aspects of their ac-
tivities.  It can promote and coordinate their 
capital  spending,  assist  miners  and 
steelworkers facing redundancy, grant loans, 
etc. The crisis affecting the European steel in-
dustry in the 1980s demonstrated the scope 
of the Commission's activities in this field. 
Under the  EEC  Treaty,  it  has  many  similar 
powers, especially with  regard  to competi-
tion (keeping restrictive practices and market 
dominance within bounds; setting limits to 
or prohibiting State subsidies; discouraging 
discriminatory tax  practices,  etc.).  In  addi-
tion, it has been given various powers by the 
Council  in  connection  with  the  common 
policies  (agriculture,  fisheries,  commercial 
policy,  the environment, etc.) and comple-
tion of the internal market. 
Under the Euratom Treaty it has the same sort 
of supervisory responsibilities as in the coal 
and steel industries, covering such matters as 
supplies of fissile material, radiation protec-
tion,  inspection  of  nuclear  plants  and 
dissemination of technical information. 
3. Administration of  the safeguard clauses in 
the Treaties 
These clauses allow Treaty requirements to 
be  waived  in  exceptional  circumstances. 
This places a very heavy responsibility on the 
Commission.  Had  it  been  left  to  the  in-
dividual  States  to  decide  whether special 
problems or circumstances entitled them to 
bypass the rules laid down in the Treaty or in 
implementing  regulations,  interpretations 
would  have  differed  sooner  or  later  and 
before long each State would have been do-
ing as it pleased. The Treaties wisely provid-
ed that only the Commission may authorize 
waivers  ('derogations')  at  the  request  of  a 
Member State and that in doing so, it must act 
in the strictest independence and objectivity 
after considering all the circumstances, tak-
ing care to ensure that the operation of the 
common market is affected as little as poss-
ible. The Council has given the Commission 
similar powers in legislation on the common 
policies. 
The Treaties  contained clauses enabling a 
wide  variety  of  waivers  to  be  authorized, 
ranging  from  tariff quotas  to  measures  ex-
cluding a whole sector of the economy from 
the rules.  Most  of them  were valid  for  the 
duration  of  the  transitional  period  only, 
though Article  115  EEC,  which provides for 
action  to  prevent  trade  with  non-member 
countries from  being deflected, will  remain 
in force until the completion of the internal 
market in 1993. The clauses most commonly 
invoked were those under the ECSC and EEC 
Treaties,  but  the  High  Authority  and  the 
Commission succeeded in keeping deroga-
tions within strict limits. New general  safeguard  clauses  have  been 
written into subsequent accession treaties to 
deal  with  problems  involving  the  new 
Member States. They are of limited duration, 
the only ones still in force being those pro-
vided for by the Spanish and Portuguese Acts 
of  Accession (due to expire atthe end of 1992 
or,  in a few cases, at the end of 1995). 
By contrast the Community legislation that 
has  grown  out of the  Treaties  allows  for 
various limited exceptions in specific cases. 
The  Commission  is  responsible  for  ad-
ministering these, though in certain cases the 
Council may subsequently be asked to con-
firm  or modify the  measures  taken  by  the 
Commission. Recourse to these exceptional 
measures has become less and less frequent 
and the Commission has always insisted on 
granting  derogations  only where they  are 
necessary and on condition that they are im-
plemented  in  such  a way  as  to avoid  any 
substantial  effect on the functioning of the 
common market. 
4. Administration of  Community funds 
The  Commission  is  responsible  for  ad-
ministering  appropriations  for  the  Com-
munities' public expenditure and  the  four 
major Community Funds. 
As early as  1952 the ECSC  levy (the ECSC's 
own resource)  made it possible not just to 
guarantee  Community  borrowing  but  to 
finance operations in the coal and  steel  in-
dustries.  The  ECSC · operating  budget  for 
1990 was ECU 435 million. Most of this was 
spent  on  grants  for  research  (ECU  88 
million),  interest  subsidies  on  investment 
and  conversion  loans  (ECU  68  million), 
grants for the retraining and redeployment of 
workers (ECU  184 million) and other social 
measures  linked to the restructuring of the 
steel  industry (ECU  50 million). 
On the  Euratom  side,  ever  since  1958  the 
Commission  has  run  Community  nuclear 
research  and  training  programmes  which 
have led, in particular, to the setting up of the 
joint  Research  Centre,  consisting  of  four 
nuclear research  establishments, at lspra in 
Italy, Karlsruhe in Germany, Geel in Belgium 
and Petten  in The Netherlands. 
Major changes have been made to research 
activities since the 1970s. The Community 
has made large-scale efforts to coordinate the 
nuclear research  activities  of the  Member 
States in order to carry out joint projects, of 
which the  most  spectacular  has  been  JET 
Ooint  European  Torus),  a  vast  installation 
designed to obtain more information on con-
trolled nuclear fusion, sited at Culham ncar 
London. 
But the most important development is that 
Community  research  has  extended  well 
beyond the nuclear field and  now covers a 
wide range of  activities. As a consequence of 
the  Single  European  Act  research  is  now 
organized  within  multiannual  framework 
programmes,  whose  purpose  is  to  coor-
dinate and (through part-financing) promote 
research both in laboratories and institutions 
in  the  Member  States  and  in  the  joint 
Research Centre, which was reorganized in 
1989. 
Under the  present  framework programme 
(1990-94),  Community  action  focuses  on 
three main areas: enabling technologies (in-
formation  and  communication  techno-
logies, industrial and material technologies), 
management of natural resources  (environ-
ment, life sciences and technologies, energy) 
and  management of intellectual resources. 
A total of ECU 5 700 million has so far been 
budgeted  for the programme;  this amount 
may be revised  in 1992. 
The major Funds administered by the Com-
mission  for the  European  Economic Com-
munity have relatively substantial resources. 
There is, first of  all, the European Agricultural 
Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGGF) 
whose Guarantee Section is responsible for 
all financing of  measures agreed by the Com-
munity  concerning  agricultural  market 
organization and  support.  It is  the only in-
stance where a common policy covers an en-
tire  sector of the  economy and  the  Com-
munity is  wholly responsible for determin-
ing  and  providing the  financial  resources. 
That  is  why  agricultural  expenditure accounts  for a considerable  proportion of 
the  Community  budget  (57.8%  in  1990). 
EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure in 1990 was 
ECU 26 500 million. The reform of the com-
mon agricultural policy undertaken in 1988 
following a series of Commission initiatives 
led to gradual stabilization of  agricultural ex-
penditure. 
The structural Funds comprise the European 
Social  Fund, the EAGGF Guidance Section 
and  the  European  Regional  Development 
Fund.  Under the Single  European  Act they 
were  radically  reformed  in  1988  so  as  to 
forge a closer partnership between the Com-
mission and the national, regional and local 
authorities involved in the work of  the Funds 
and to concentrate action on five priority ob-
jectives: 
(i)  the  development  and  structural  adjust-
ment of regions whose development is lag-
ging behind; 
(ii)  the  conversion  of regions  seriously  af-
fected  by industrial decline; 
(iii) combating long-term unemployment; 
(iv)  more effective occupational integration 
of young people; 
(v)  the adjustment of agricultural structures 
and  rural development. 
The reform of  the Funds was backed up by a 
substantial increase in their budget: commit-
ment appropriations will be doubled in real 
terms  between  1987  and  1993,  providing 
more than ECU 60 000 m  iII ion overfive years 
towards the strengthening of economic and 
social cohesion in the Community. 
The European  Social  Fund  (ESF),  for which 
provision was made in the Treaty itself, seeks 
mainly  to  expand  vocational  training  for 
workers  in order to  promote employment 
a'nd  occupational  mobility.  Its  budget was 
ECU  3 400 million in 1989 and ECU 4 100 
million  in  1990  (commitment  appro-
priations). 
The  purpose of the EAGGF Guidance Sec-
tion is to contribute to the modernization of 
agricultural structures and the development 
of rural areas. It had a budget of ECU  1 400 
million in  1989 and  ECU  1 700  million in 
1990 (commitment appropriations). 
The European Regional  Development Fund 
(ERDF) was established in 1975 to help cor-
rect regional imbalances in the Community. 
It had a budget of  ECU 4 500 million in 1989 
and ECU 5 400 million in 1990 {commitment 
appropriations). 
In  a different field altogether, the European 
Development Fund  (EDF),  for which provi-
sion was made in the Treaty of Rome,  is the 
principal  instrument  in  the  Community's 
development aid  effort.  It operates  on the 
basis of agreements concluded periodically 
between  the  Community and  its  Member 
States  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries which 
formerly had  special ties with them. These 
agreements  have  included  the  series  of 
Yaounde  Conventions  concluded  with the 
African  States  and  Madagascar  associated 
with the Community of Six and, following 
enlargement, the  Lome Conventions. Sixty-
six  ACP  States  were party to  the  Lome  IV 
Convention signed on 15  December 1989. 
Community financial assistance for 1990-95 
was set at ECU  12 000 million, made up of 
ECU  10 800 million under the EDF (grants 
and  loans  on  special  terms)  and  the  re-
mainder as  loans administered by the Euro-
pean  Investment  Bank.  The  Lome  Conven-
tion  also  provides  for  very  broad  trade 
cooperation,  economic  cooperation  (pro-
motion  of  industrial  and  agricultural 
development, finance for mining  operations) 
and a scheme for stabilizing export earnings 
from the chief ACP products. 
The  Commission  also  runs  Community 
operations  to  assist  non-ACP  developing 
countries,  including  the  Mediterranean 
countries and a number of countries in Asia 
and  Latin  America.  These  operations 
primarily involve technical assistance and in-
vestment support (with appropriations totall-
ing  ECU  631  million  in  1990).  A  con-
siderable amount of  food aid is also provided 
(ECU  510 million in 1990). Committees 
We have seen how much the Council has ex-
tended the Commission's management and 
administration function in the EEC context by 
giving it additional responsibility for the im-
plementation  of  secondary  legislation.  In 
many cases, the Council was anxious that the 
powers so conferred should be exercised in 
close consultation with the governments of 
the Member States.  For this  reason various 
committees  of  government  representatives 
are attached to the Commission. 
As  well  as  making  this  transfer of  respon-
sibilities the general  rule,  the Single  Euro- . 
pean Act also envisaged an overhaul of the 
committee system, and on  13 July  1987 the 
Council adopted a Decision-known as the 
Decision on committee procedures -which 
provides for four procedures. 
In  advisory  committees,  the  Commission 
listens to the opinions of representatives of 
the Member States. While it has promised to 
take the fullest account of the views express-
ed during these consultations, it is in no way 
bound by them and the committee has no in-
fluence  on  the further  course of  the  pro-
cedure. 
The declarations annexed to the Single Euro-
pean Act recommend the use of the advisory 
committee procedure for measures relating 
to the completion of the internal market. 
Management committees were first set up in 
1962  under  the  arrangements  for  the 
agricultural  markets  and  in  the event  have 
proved to be very valuable and effective. One 
committee  exists  for  each  category  of 
products. 
The  procedure  is  that  the  implementing 
measure the Commission intends to enact is 
submitted  in  draft  form  to  the appropriate 
management  committee,  which  gives  its 
opinion by qualified majority (54 votes out of 
76), votes being weighted as in the Council. 
Again the Commission  is  not bound by the 
committee's opinion; it takes note of it,  but 
remains entirely free to decide for itself; and 
the measure, once enacted, has direct force 
of law. However, if the Commission decides 
to go  against the committee's opinion, the 
matter is referred to the Council, which may 
reverse  the Commission's  decision  within 
one month.  If, on the other hand, the Com-
mission's decision is in line with the commit-
tee's opinion, or if no opinion has been forth-
coming  (the  committee  having  failed  to 
muster  a  qualified  majority  either  for  or 
against), the decision is final and there is no 
appeal to the Council. 
The  management  committee  formula  is 
widely used  and  works extremely well.  In 
1989, for example, there were 359 meetings 
of  various  management  committees  con-
cerning  the  common  agricultural  policy. 
Favourable opinions were given  in 1609 out 
of  1749  cases.  One adverse  opinion  was 
given.ln 139 cases no opinion was offered by 
the committee. 
This is eloquent testimony to the atmosphere 
of  cooperation  and  mutual  confidence 
which has developed in the committees be-
tween  the Commission's  departments  and 
the national departments which subsequent-
ly enforce the Commission's decisions. 
The management committee's function is to 
act as a kind of alarm mechanism. When the 
Commission departs from an opinion given 
by a qualified majority-that is, voted for by 
most  of the government  representatives -
this is a clear indication of a serious problem, 
which  it  is  only  right  and  proper that the 
Council  should  discuss.  The fact  that  it  is 
seldom called upon to do so  is  proof of the 
measure of understanding between the par-
ties and of how well the system works. 
The third  type of committee set up  by the 
Council  is  the  regulatory  committee,  in 
which the management committee formula 
is applied to other fields.  Jt was used initially 
in the management of the Common Customs 
Tariff, then for the management and adapta-
tion of common standards (food, veterinary 
and  plant health  regulations, for  instance), 
environmental  legislation,  etc.  The  pro-
cedure  is  similar  to  that  followed  in  the 
management committees,  but with  greater 
scope for appeals to the Council. When the measures envisaged by the Com-
mission go against the committee's opinion, 
or  when  no  opinion  is  forthcoming,  the 
Commission makes a proposal to the Coun-
cil on the measures to be taken. The Council 
then decides by a qualified majority vote.  If 
it has not reached a decision within a certain 
time (normally three months) afterthe matter 
is  referred  to  it,  the Commission takes  the 
decision itself. An exception to this rule has 
been introduced in a number of  cases where, 
if the  Council  has  expressly  rejected  the 
Commission's proposal by a simple majority, 
the Commission may not take a decision and 
must present a new proposal. 
Finally, a special procedure has been set up 
for  commercial  policy measures  or action 
under the  safeguard  clauses,  enabling the 
Commission to take directly applicable deci-
sions once it has received the advisory com-
mittee's opinion. None the less, these deci-
sions  must  be  approved  by  the  Council 
within  a  period  of  three  months,  failing 
which they become null and void. 
Parliament has strong reservations about the 
use of  these various types of committee, fear-
ing that they may affect the Commission's in-
dependence.  Moreover,  in  practice,  the 
Council  has  almost  entirely  ignored  the 
undertaking given by the governments of  the 
Member States to give precedence to the use 
of the  advisory  committee  procedure  for 
measures  relating to the completion of the 
internal market; instead it is making increas-
ing  use  of  procedures  which  offer  no 
guarantee that a decision will be taken (cer-
tain types of  regulatory committee) atthe risk 




POLICY AND DEFENDS THE 
COMMUNITY INTEREST. 
IT  SEES TO IT THAT 
COMMUNITY POLICY FORMS 
A CONSISTENT WHOLE 
The  ECSC  High Authority and  the Euratom 
Commission  had  a  predominantly  ad-
ministrative  and  supervisory  function,  the 
framing  of  common  policies  being  par-
ticularly  difficult  for  Communities  with 
jurisdiction  in  rather  limited  fields.  The 
merger of the executives in 1967 permitted 
the  pooling of responsibilities  in  a  single 
Commission  and  the  drawing  up  of  a 
number  of  common  policies:  industrial 
policy,  energy  policy,  research  and 
technological  policy  - which  despite 
valuable achievements in the early days had 
been  hampered  by  the  existence  of three 
separate executives. 
From  the outset the  EEC  Commission  had 
regarded the initiation of common policies 
as one of its  most important functions, and 
the single Commission has followed suit. Ex-
cept  where  economic constraints  dictated 
otherwise,  the  EEC  Treaty  is  what may  be 
termed a 'framework treaty', unlike its ECSC 
and Euratom counterparts which are 'code of 
rules treaties'. The latter spell out the rules to 
be applied and the tasks to be performed in 
their respective spheres.  The  EEC Treaty-
apart  from  'automatic'  provisions  on  the 
dismantling of tariffs and quotas-confines 
itself to sketching out the policy lines to be 
pursued in the main areas of economic ac-
tivity, leaving it to the Community's institu-
tions, and more especially the Council and 
the Commission in conjunction with Parlia-
ment, to work out the actual arrangements to 
be applied within this framework. 
In  a  sense,  everything  to  do  with  the 
economic union was left blank in the Treaty, 
but the blanks can be filled in by the institu-
tions. There is  no need for fresh  treaties or 
fresh  parliamentary ratification.  [!Z] The institutions are thus empowered to bring 
in  full-scale  'European  laws',  directly  en-
forceable  in  all  the  Member  States  and 
capable of producing radical changes in the 
sectors concerned. To give an  example, the 
great  corpus  of  'European  laws'  on 
agriculture,  promulgated  from  1962  on-
wards, is comparable in scope to the corpus 
of  rules  contained  in  the  ECSC  Treaty. 
Moreover, the guidelines laid down by the 
Heads of  State or Government of the Nine at 
the  summit conferences  in The  Hague  in 
1969  and  Paris  in  1972,  and  subsequently 
reiterated,  require  the  Community  institu-
tions to draw up common policies in fields 
not strictly provided for in the Treaties. (The 
best  example  is  monetary policy,  with the 
European  Monetary. System,  but others  in-
clude  regional  development,  the  environ-
ment and consumer' protection.) The Single 
Act puts the final stamp on Community ac-
tion in several of these fields such as social 
policy,  research  and  technology,  en-
vironmental and monetary policy. 
It is worth pausing a moment to consider the 
frequent  but  mistaken  contention  that  the 
EEC Treaty is less supranational, or more in-
tergovernmental, than the ECSC Treaty. The 
ECSC  Treaty's  'code  of rules'  defined  the 
High  Authority's  implementing  powers  in 
detail.  By  contrast  the  Commission's  im-
plementing  powers  in  each  of the  areas 
covered  by  the  EEC  Treaty  could  not  be 
known until the requisite common policies 
had been agreed. But in fact, as far as restric-
tive practices and agriculture arc concerned, 
for example, the powers it wields are similar 
to those  conferred  under the  ECSC  Treaty, 
and in the field of  commercial policy they are 
considerably greater.  In  matters of finance, 
however,  the  powers  and  capacity  for  in-
dependent action which were conferred on 
the High Authority by the Treaty of Paris from 
the outset (fixing of ECSC levy rates,  issuing 
of loans, etc.) are still far greater than those 
available  to  the  Commission  in  the  areas 
covered by the Treaties of Rome, even despite 
developments since 1958. 
In point of fact, the Paris and Rome Treaties 
arc based on the same principles and purport 
to  set  up parallel  institutional systems.  But 
the EEC Treaty, evolving as it goes along and 
allowing the  arrangement  best  suited  to a 
particular sector or situation to be  worked 
out pragmatically,  has  perhaps been  better 
able to allay the fears of those not fully con-
verted to the Community idea. The balance 
which it represents  between the powers of 
the national governments and the powers of 
the European institutions is more clearly ap-
parent to countries which are just getting to 
know and  learning to  live with the  Com-munities.  This  is  true  despite  all  the  dif-
ficulties the EEC  has  encountered over the 
years. 
Recent  developments,  such  as  the conclu-
sion and entry into force of the Single Euro-
pean Act, the programme to complete the in-
ternal market by the end of 1992 and the con-
vening of two new Intergovernmental Con-
ferences on economic and monetary union 
and  on political union, have borne out the 
approach adopted in 1956 and 1957 by those 
who  negotiated  the  Rome  Treaties.  They 
organized a cautious new impetus to the pro-
cess of building the Community but provid-
ed it  with the capacity to evolve and progress, 
in particular through the gradual extension 
of majority voting in the Council and direct 
elections to Parliament. The obstacles which 
prevented progress after 1966 (these will be 
dealt with in a later section) have now been 
removed and the forces for change with  in the 
Community  system  are  able  to  take  full 
effect. THE COMMISSION-COUNCIL DIALOGUE 
The task of building up the fabric of European 
economic union  rests with the institutions. 
The  Treaties  laid  the foundations,  but the 
structure itself still  had  to  be erected. And 
even once that structure is in place for a par-
ticular sector, the institutions are also respon-
sible for the formulation and day-tCHiay im-
plementation of the Community policy that 
is  to  replace  the Member States'  separate  · 
policies. 
The  ECSC  Treaty  made  provision  for 
dialogue between the Commission and the 
Council,  but on  a  limited  scale only.  The 
Commission (or the High Authority, as it then 
was) bears a great deal of the responsibility 
for  implementation  of  the  Treaty.  Never-
theless the Council's assent (in some cases 
unanimous)  is  required  for  certain  particu-
larly  important  decisions  - to  declare  a 
'manifest crisis' for instance (as in the case of 
steel) or to adapt the provisions of the Treaty. 
The approach is, of course, not the same as 
in the Rome Treaties.  In the ECSC, the High 
Authority  (now  the  Commission)  decides 
with  the Council's assent;  in  the  EEC  and 
Euratom, the Council decides on a proposal 
from the Commission. The difference is not 
without its political implications, but in both 
cases the two institutions have a part to play 
before a decision can be adopted. 
Under the  Rome  Treaties,  any  measure  of 
general application or of a certain level of im-
portance must be enacted  by the Council, 
but only in  rare cases can the Council pro-
ceed  without  a  proposal  from  the  Com-
mission. 
The  Commission,  then,  has  a  permanent 
right and duty to initiate action. If it submits 
no  proposals, the Council  is  paralysed and 
the progress of the Community comes to a 
halt- in  agriculture,  in  transport,  in  com-
mercial  policy,  in  harmonization  of  legis-
lation, whatever the field  may be. 
As an indication of the volume of work done 
by  the  institutions,  the  statistics  for  1989 
show  that  the  Commission  laid  624  pro-
posals and drafts, and 214 communications, 
memoranda and reports before the Council. 
In the sameyeartheCouncil, besides dealing 
with  purely  procedural  matters  and  with 
budgets and  financial  regulations, adopted 
394  regulations,  79  directives  and  161 
decisions. 
Since the most commonly used procedure, 
by far,  in dealings between the Commission 
and the Council is that laid down in the Trea-
ty of Rome, we shall look at it in somewhat 
greater detail. 
Once a proposal is lodged, a dialogue begins 
between the ministers  in  the Council, who 
put their  national  points  of  view,  and  the 
Commission, which seeks to uphold the in-
terest of the Community as a whole and find 
European solutions to common problems. 
There might seem to be some danger of the 
dialogue  becoming  rather  one-sided 
because of the Commission's weak position 
compared to the governments', with the full 
weight  of  national  sovereign  authority 
behind them.  But  in  fact the Rome Treaties 
contrive rather ingeniously to ensure that the 
two are evenly matched. 
To  begin with,  it  is the Commission which 
draws  up  the  proposal  the  Council  is  to 
discuss- and only on the basis of that pro-
posal  can the Council deliberate at all.  So 
here the Commission can already exert some 
real influence. But its position is buttressed in 
other  ways  too.  Article  149  EEC  (119 
Euratom), one of the key components of the 
institutional structure, provides that 'where, 
in pursuance of this Treaty, the Council acts 
on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission, 
unanimity shall be required for an act con-
stituting  an  amendment  to  that  proposal'. 
This means that if the Council is unanimous 
it can decide on its own authority, even if its 
decision departs from the Commission's pro-
posal. This is fair enough, since the Council is  then expressing a view shared by all  the 
Member States. 
By contrast, the majority rule applies only if 
their decision  is  in  line with  the Commis-
sion's  proposal.  In  other  words,  if  the 
Member States are divided, all they can do by 
a majority vote  is  to accept the proposal in 
toto,  without  amendment,  since  only  the 
Commission can amend the proposal. 
The  position, then,  is  that the Council can 
either adopt the Commission's proposal as it 
stands by a majority; or it can depart from the 
proposal if there is unanimity; or it may fail 
to come to a decision at all. So the Commis-
sion  does  in  fact  have  genuine bargaining 
power in the Council. The dialogue can be-
and is-conducted on ground of the Com-
mission's own choosing. 
This dialogue obeys its own dynamic laws. 
Fairly substantial EEC experience has shown 
that application of the majority rule docs not 
mean  that  a  State  is  liable  to  find  itself 
'isolated'.  When  drafting  its  proposal,  the 
Commission will have been at pains to take 
the often widely varying interests of the in-
dividual States into account and to establish 
where the general interest lies. It is only nor-
mal in a small'club' of this kind that Council 
and  Commission  Members  like  to  be  in 
agreement if they can. Faced with the pros-
pect  of  being  outvoted,  a  minister  may 
therefore decide to abandon an extreme or 
isolated  position,  while  in  the  interests  of 
good  relations  the  Commission,  and  the 
ministers who favour its proposal, may make 
the effort needed to secure a rapprochement. 
The result- a trifle paradoxical, but amply 
confirmed  in  pactice- is that the majority 
rule makes unanimity easier and quicker.  In 
this delicate interplay of forces, the Commis-
sion  is  always  in  a  position  to  sway  the 
outcome. 
The Commission  is thus centrally placed in 
the  Council;  it  can  act  as  'honest broker' 
between  governments  and  apply  the  pro-
mpting and pressure required to evolve for-
mulas acceptable all  round. 
The  political  implications are  more impor-
tant still.  The Commission's proposals em-
body a policy based solely on the interests of 
the Community as a whole. The fact that the 
Commission is  in office for a fixed term en-
sures continuity, and the Council can only 
pronounce on  measures  proposed  by  the 
Commission  for  putting the policy  into  ef-
fect. There is no danger, then, of the Council 
adopting conflicting proposals on  different 
issues as alliances change and power strug-
gles develop between governments. 
Nor can a majority in the Council impose on 
one  of  the  minority  a  measure  gravely 
damaging  to  that  State's  vital  interests 
without Commission  backing.  If the Com-
mission does its job properly,  it will  not be 
party to any such move. This therefore pro-
vides an  important guarantee, especially to 
the smaller Member States,  and they  have 
always set great store by it. 
[]UNANIMITY AND 
MAJORITY 
Under the Paris Treaty, as we have seen, the 
Council's assent is required only in a limited 
number of  cases;  sometimes  it  has  to  be 
unanimous, but mostly it can be given by a 
majority  vote.  This  system  has  been  duly 
adhered to since the Treaty came into force. 
Interestingly  enough,  when  the  Council 
refused to give its assent to the High Authori-
ty's plan to declare a state of 'manifest crisis' 
in the coal industry in May 1959, the decision 
was  one calling for  a majority  vote  rather 
than unanimous assent. This  means  that  the  Council's  refusal  was 
due not to a solitary veto but to the fact that 
it could not muster a majority in favour. 
Under the  EEC  Treaty  most  Council  deci-
sions during the first two stages of  the transi-
tional period-from 1958 to the end of 1965 
- had to be unanimous. Consequently the 
procedure  described  above  was  not often 
needed.  But  even  when  it was,  the  Com-
munity spirit of  the members of the Council, 
the collective authority of the Commission 
and the personal reputation of its members 
always  ensured  that  the  dialogue went off 
smoothly and  enabled  the  Commission to 
exploit its role of initiator and conciliator to 
the full. 
The scheduled move into the third stage, on 
1 january 1966, was to have brought a major 
extension  of the  areas  in  which  majority 
decisions were possible. But at this point the 
majority rule  became the  focus  of a Com-
munity crisis.  Was  it tolerable,  one of the 
governments  demanded,  that  a  Member 
State should be overruled by the rest when 
one of its essential  interests was at stake? 
This question cannot be answered by citing 
the relevant provisions, nor is there an objec-
tive definition of what constitutes an 'essen-
tial interest'. 
Indeed,  if the  matter  is  viewed  purely  in 
terms  of interests,  it could well be  that  in 
areas where all the Member  States have relin-
quished their freedom of action to the Com-
munity, the vetoing of  a Community decision 
on the grounds of  national interest could pre-
judice the vital  interests  of other Member 
States  in that they would be harmed by the 
paralysis of the Community.  By  contrast,  a 
State accepting the Community system and 
relying on its inner logic, its institutions and 
their rules and traditions can rest assured that 
these will provide all reasonable safeguards. 
In the general interest the Community must 
take account of the essential  interests of its 
members.  The  institutions  are  therefore· 
bound  to  give  these  interests  every  con-
sideration.  Indeed  the  Community's 
ultimate objective of an  ever-closer  union 
among its  peoples would not be  feasible if 
one nation's vital interests were to be severe-
ly  harmed.  Moreover  the  Council  pro-
cedures  just  described  are  calculated  to 
achieve  the  broadest  possible  measure  of 
agreement.  Conversely,  even  where 
unanimity is the rule, no member of a Com-
munity can disregard the general interest in 
assessing his own: unanimity in a Communi-
ty cannot be equated with an absolute right 
of veto. 
Thus,  in a living Community, abuse of ma-
jority  voting  - and  probably  abuse  of 
unanimity too- is a theoretical risk which, 
with the Community's inner bonds drawing 
ever closer as  it moves  forward, should be 
less and less likely to materialize, while the 
possibility  of  majority  decisions  should 
render the whole system  more flexible and 
more dynamic. 
The only possible answer is to have faith in 
the  future,  faith  in  the  institutions'  and 
governments' good sense and desire to work 
amicably together. In the end, the six Foreign 
Ministers in  session  in  Luxembourg on 28 
january 1966, after months of crisis and dif-
ficult  debate,  had  to  acknowledge  that 
failure to agree on the application of  the ma-
jority rule was no reason for not continuing 
with the joint venture. 
The crisis of 1965-66 and what has come to 
be known as the 'Luxembourg compromise' 
- though  it  was,  in  fact,  a  statement  of 
disagreement - have,  however,  had  a pro-
found effect on the subsequent development 
oftheCommunity. Fora longtime afterwards 
majority  decisions  were  confined  to 
budgetary  and  administrative matters,  and 
various bad habits grew up. Some of  the new 
Member States joining the Community since 
then have pleaded 'very important interests' 
and demanded unanimity. This state of  affairs 
was confirmed in the drafting and adoption 
of  the  Solemn  Declaration  on  European 
Union, signed in Stuttgart on 19 june 1983 by 
the Heads of State or Government meeting 
within the European Council. 
At the end of  the 1970s, systematic use of the 
unanimity rule in the Council together with 
major disagreements over several  important issues (own resources, the United Kingdom 
contribution to the budget and the reform of 
the common agricultural policy)  led to the 
virtual paralysis of the Community during a 
long period of crisis which lasted from 1979 
to 1984. As a result, the governments of the 
Member  States,  under  pressure  from  the 
European  Parliament  (which  adopted  the 
draft Treaty on European Union in February 
1984),  committed  themselves  for  the  first 
time  to  a thorough  revision  of the  Rome 
Treaties.  The  return  to' majority voting was 
cemented by the Single European Act, signed 
in  February  1986,  which  substantially  ex-
tended the Council's scope for taking majori-
ty decisions, particularly as regards the inter-
nal  market.  These  changes  ratified  by  the 
parliaments  of the  Twelve  marked  a  fun-
damental shift in political attitudes. 
Since 1986 a large number of Council deci-
sions have been taken on a majority basis and 
the use of voting has become common prac-
tice. Indeed the Council Presidency is often 
The Council in session 
content  to  see  the  required  majority 
mustered in favour of a proposal, which the 
Commission may have amended. Today the 
'Luxembourg  compromise'  is  hardly  ever 
used to block a majority decision. In view of 
this new situation, the Council amended its 
rules  of procedure  in  1987  in  order to  lay 
down detailed rules  on voting procedures. 
Over  the  years  both  delegations  and 
ministers have  gradually changed  their ap-
proach  to discussions to take  into account 
the prospect of a final decision by majority 
vote. 
D THE EUROPEAN  COUNCIL 
In  December  1974  the  Heads  of State  or 
Government, meeting in Paris, took two ma-
jor decisions.  Firstly  they  agreed  that  the 
European  Parliament  should  be  directly 
elected by universal suffrage (though it took 
five years before direct elections were actual-
ly  held).  Secondly  they  decided  to  meet regularly within a 'European Council' with 
their Foreign Ministers and the President and 
one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commis-
sion.  This  decision  came  into  effect  im-
mediately, the first European Council being 
held in March 1975 in Dublin. Subsequently 
the existence of the European Council was 
formally enshrined  in the  Single  European 
Act in 1986. 
The importance of the European Council in 
the workings of the Community has steadily 
increased. This trend is  linked with the fact 
that the  authority of the  Heads  of State or 
Government has tended to grow stronger in 
most of  the 12 Member States, either because 
of  the  way  their  constitutions  work  or 
because  of how  political  affairs  are  con-
ducted. Their personal intervention in Com-
munity affairs  is therefore a major develop-
ment.  Since  1975  they  have  provided 
political impetus or laid down guidelines in 
areas  of prime importance (such  as  direct 
elections  to  Parliament,  the  European 
Monetary  System,  reform  of  agricultural 
policy, the accession of new members, com-
pletion of  the internal market and economic 
and monetary union). 
At  the same  time,  the  simple fact  that the 
European Council exists and meets regularly 
has had an effect on the position of  the Coun-
cil itself by opening up the possibility of ap-
peal to a higher authority (even  though the 
Heads  of State  or Government have,  on  a 
number of  occasions, refused to take on such 
a role). The Commission-and in particular 
its  President  - has  been  given  increased 
political status through participation in Euro-
pean  Councils,  even  at  the most  restricted 
sessions.  Nevertheless,  the  nature  of the 
meetings  (free  of  any  institutional  for-
malities)  and  the  fact  that  they  combine 
discussions  on  Community  matters  with 
discussions  on  political  cooperation  have 
emphasized  the  intergovernmental  aspects 
of  these  European  'summits'.  The 
significance attached to the position of the 
Presidency  of the  European  Council,  par-
ticularly when it is held by one of the larger 
countries, has  strengthened this impression 
as far as the public in concerned. 
However,  the  conclusions  reached  by  the 
European  Council are  one thing,  their im-
plementation  is  another.  The  European 
Council's  working  methods  (politicians 
meeting with neither civil servants  nor ex-
perts  present)  make for an  effective system 
but at  the  same  time are  a source  of dif-
ficulties later when it comes to  implemen-
tation. The institutions are aware of the prob-
lem and have commissioned several studies 
(such as the report of the 'Three Wise Men' 
in  1979),  but  as  yet  no solution  has  been 
found. Meanwhile, in 1986, it was agreed to 
restrict European Council meetings to two a 
year  in  future,  except  in  special  cir-
cumstances, with a view to limiting interven-
tion by the European Council in the general 
running of the Community. 
[J THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY 
Another significant  institutional  change  in 
recent years has been the bigger role played 
by  the Council Presidency.  Like the setting 
up  of the  European  Council,  this  has  not 
come about as the result of  an amendment or 
addition to the Treaties.  It is a development 
which can  be attributed, firstly, to practical 
needs  resulting  from  the  more  complex 
operation  in  an  enlarged  Community of a 
body with representatives from nine, then 10 
and now 12 countries plus the Commission 
and, secondly,  to political factors  resulting 
from the excessive insistence on unanimity 
(and the consequent need for compromises 
which may bear little relation to the Commis-
sion  proposal) and  from the way the  Euro-
pean Council operates. 
By limiting the length of  the Presidency to six 
months,  the  negotiators  of  the  Treaty 
established a balance which still holds good 
over 30 years later. Often a country's turn in 
the Presidency is the occasion for it to show 
its commitment to Europe and six months is 
long enough in running the Council to pro-
duce  results.  The  fact  that  the  Presidency 
rotates regularly and thus alternates between The European Council in session in Rome on 27 and 28 October 1990 
the larger and smaller countries also obviates 
any  risk of hegemony. 
Cooperation  between  the  Presidency  and 
the Commission  remains  the general  rule: 
properly applied,  it  leads to increased effi-
ciency through a distribution of roles, provid-
ed that the Commission does not yield any of 
its powers or relax its vigilance and provided 
that the Council Presidency performs effec-
tively in its role as political stimulator and im-
partial referee at meetings of the Council and 
its preparatory bodies. THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
D A DIRECTLY  ELECTED 
PARLIAMENT . 
On 7 and  10 June  1979  the citizens of the 
Community for the  first  time elected  their 
representatives to the European Parliament. 
Provision had been made for these elections 
more than 20 years previously in the Treaty 
of Rome, which stipulated that the Assembly 
-the  European Parliament-would eventu-
ally be elected by direct universal suffrage. ln. 
1960 Parliament had submitted a draft con-
vention to the  Council, but this  was  never 
followed up. 
In  December  1974  the  Heads  of State  or 
Government  agreed  in  principle to  direct 
elections  and  in  January  1976  Parliament 
adopted a new draft convention. At the end 
of 1975, in Rome, the European Council con-
firmed that the  first direct elections would 
take place on a single date in  1978.  In July 
1976, in Brussels,  it decided on the number 
and distribution of seats in the future Parlia-
ment.  Finally,  on  20  September  1976,  the 
Council  approved  and  signed  the  in-
struments  for the  election  of Members  of 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage. 
However, ratification of the September 1976 
'Act'  by  national  parliaments  took  longer 
than expected, partly because in the United 
Kingdom the elections and the electoral pro-
cedure  to  be  folloWed  were  treated  as  a 
single issue.  But finally, on 1 July 1978, the 
'Act concerning the election of  the represent-
atives of  the Assembly by direct universal suf-
frage' entered into force. 
Thefirstelections were held on 7 and 10 June. 
1979, each State using its own national elec-
toral system, and national voting procedures 
were  again  used  when  the  next  two 
Parliaments were elected in 1984 and 1989. 
Eleven countries use systems involving a con-
siderable degree of proportional representa-· 
tion, with only the United Kingdom (except 
Northern Ireland) using single-ballot majori-
ty voting by constituency. 
D THE  ROLE AND 
FUNCTIONING OF 
PARLIAMENT 
The  composition of Parliament  makes  it a 
fully  integrated  Community  institution. 
There are  no national sections,  only Com-
munity-level political groups.  The  fact  that 
the  Commission  is  answerable  to  Parlia-
ment, and  Parliament alone,  guarantees  its 
independence. 
Parliament thus keeps constant watch on the 
Commission's  doings,  making  sure  that  it 
faithfully represents the Community interest, 
ready at any time to call it to order if it gives 
the impression of  yielding to the lobbying of 
governments. In addition, Parliament plays a 
part  in  the  Community's  legislative  pro-
cedure, as will be shown later. 
The  election  of Parliament  did  not  bring 
about any change in its powers. However, the 
increase in the number of  MEPs and the fact 
that, with a few exceptions, they sit only as 
MEPs (and not national MPs as well) has set 
a faster parliamentary pace and a more ag-
gressive style. 
Except in August the House sits for one week 
each  month  (normally in  Strasbourg),  and 
sometimes  in  between  to  discuss  special 
items like the budget. Between the monthly 
part-sessions,  two weeks  are  set  aside  for 
meetings  of the  parliamentary committees 
(there are  18  standing committees) and the 
third week for meetings of political groups. 
The appropriate Member of  the Commission 
or his representative appears before the com-
mittees to give an  account of the decisions 
taken  by  the  Commission,  the  proposals 
presented  to the Council, and the position 
adopted  by  the  Commission,  vis-a-vis  the 
Council. 
The committees thus follow developments in 
detail and, as they usually meet in camera, 
can be given a great deal of  information, even 
on confidential matters, and  keep a careful eye on what the executive is up to. The com-
mittees  are  also  responsible  for  preparing 
Parliament's opinions on the Commission's 
proposals  to  the  Council,  as  well  as  Par-
liament's  own-initiative  resolutions.  This 
regularly involves them in hearings with in-
dependent experts and representatives of  the 
interest groups concerned. 
Questions from  Members of Parliament to 
the Commission, and to the Council and the 
Conference  of Foreign  Ministers  (political 
cooperation), provide a much-used means of 
control.  In  1989,  1 711  written  questions 
were  put  to  the  Commission,  144  to  the 
Council  and  114  to  the  Foreign  Ministers 
(political cooperation). 
Since 1973 there has been a Question Time 
at each  part-session  of Parliament. The for-
mula has proved  so popular with Members 
that,  except in the  case  of very short  part-
sessions, there are now two hour-and-a-half 
periods,  one for the  Council  and  political 
cooperation  and  one for the  Commission. 
Questions must be brief and to the point. As 
a follow-up to replies by the Commission or 
the President of the Council, the Members 
can  put  short  supplementary  questions 
which sometimes provide lively exchanges. 
In 1989the Commission replied to 581 ques-
tions during Question Time and  the  Presi-
dent of the Council to  172; there were also 
130 questions on political cooperation. 
Lastly,  Parliament can  hold urgent debates 
on current issues (Community and  interna-
tional affairs, violations of human rights, etc.) 
to bypass the sometimes rather lengthy pro-
cedure otherwise involved, under which the 
Commission  presents  a paper  ('communi-
cation') which is then discussed in commit-
tee before the debate in plenary session. One 
sitting  in  each  part-session  is  devoted  to 
urgent  topics,  the  selection  of  which 
sometimes  involves  heated  debates  and 
highly politicized voting. 
0  BUDGETARY POWERS 
When the Council decided to give the Com-
munity financial  resources  of its  own, the 
Member States agreed to amend the Treaties 
to increase Parliament's budgetary powers. 
Two treaties were concluded for this purpose 
-one on 22 April 1970 (effective 1 January 
1971), the other on 22 July 1975 (effective 1 
June 1977). The latter also set up the Court of 
Auditors. 
Parliament now has the last word on all 'non-
compulsory' expenditure, in other words ex-
penditure that  is  not the  inevitable conse-
quence  of Community  legislation.  Parlia-
ment's budgetary powers cover the  institu-
tions'  administrative  costs  and,  above  all, 
certain  operational  expenditure  (Social 
Fund,  Regional  Fund,  research  and  energy, 
industrial  policy,  etc.).  This  expenditure  is 
considerable,  representing  36%  of  the 
budget or some ECU  15 500 million in 1990, 
and it determines the Community's develop-
ment  by  boosting  certain  policies  (social, 
regional, etc.) or allowing new activities to 
be  launched  (energy,  industry,  research, 
etc.).  Parliament has the power not only to 
reallocate but also to  increase expenditure 
within certain  limits.  This  is  a good  illus-
tration  of the  political  significance  of  its 
budgetary powers. 
The remainder of the budget is made up of 
'compulsory'  expenditure  (64%  or  some 
ECU  31  200 million in 1990). Basically this is 
expenditure  on  the  common  agricultural 
policy (57.8% of  the budget in 1990), most of 
it for price support. Parliament can  propose 
'modifications'  to  this  category  of expen-
diture.  Provided  they  do  not increase  the 
total amount of expenditure such modifica-
tions are deemed to be accepted unless the 
Council rejects them by a qualified majority. 
Parliament has the right to reject the budget 
as a whole: this it did for the first time on 13 
December 1979-a few months after direct 
elections-when it threw out the draft 1980 
budget  placed  before  it  by  the  Council. 
Parliament  also  rejected  the  1985  general 
budget, as well as a supplementary budget in 
1982. 
Lastly,  it  is  Parliament's  President  who  is 
responsible for declaring that the budget has 
been finally adopted once all the procedures Members meet 
in political groups 
regardless of 
nationality 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT:  518 MEMBERS 
Parliament Is presided CM'r by 
a President assisted by 
12 Vice-Presidents 
European Democratic Group 
Group for the European 
Unitarian left 
Political composition of the  European Parliament (situation on  10 June  1990) 
18 committees 
prepare the 
work of the 
plenary 
sessions COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT COMMITTEES 
(situation on 10 June 1991) 
1.  Political Affairs Committee 
2.  Committee on Agriculture, 
Fisheries and  Rural  Development 
3.  Committee on Budgets 
4.  Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy 
5.  Committee on  Energy,  Research 
and Technology 
6.  Committee on External Economic 
Relations 
7.  Committee on Legal  Affairs 
and Citizens' Rights 
8.  Committee on Social Affairs, 
Employment and the Working 
Environment 
9.  Committee on Regional Policy 
and  Regional Planning 
have been completed. This has been an im-
portant factor  in  the  budgetary debates  in 
that Parliament has been able to bring to bear 
its  own  interpretation  of  the  complex 
budgetary rules  laid down in the  1970 and 
1975  Treaties.  In  1986,  however,  the  Court 
annulled the decision by which the President 
of  Pari iament had adopted the budget for that 
financial  year,  following an  appeal  by  the 
Council.  It  thereby  defined  the  extent  of 
Parliament's  prerogative  and  at  the  same 
time  clarified  the  interpretation  of certain 
budgetary rules. 
Parliament, then, holds a strong position in 
the budget process.  The dialogue between 
Parliament and the Council has increasingly 
come into play and  where it has  not been 
possible  to  resolve  differences,  Parliament 
has on a number of occasions been able to 
impose  its  point of view.  In  1988,  the  In-
terinstitutional  Agreement  on  budgetary 
discipline and improvement of the budgetary 
10.  Committee on Transport 
and Tourism 
11.  Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health 
and Consumer Protection 
12.  Committee on Youth, Culture, 
Education, the Media and Sport 
13.  Committee on Development 
and Cooperation 
14.  Committee on Budgetary Control 
15.  Committee on Institutional Affairs 
16.  Committee on the Rules of 
Procedure, the Verification of 
Credentials and Immunities 
17.  Committee on Women's Rights 
18.  Committee on Petitions 
procedure established the joint responsibili-
ty of Parliament, the Council and the Com-
mission  in  this  field  while respecting  the 
various  competences  attributed  to  them 
under  the  Treaties.  It  fixed  new  rules  for 
cooperation  between  the  institutions  and 
opened the way to a 'lasting peace' in the 
area of the annual budget procedure. 
CJ  LEGISLATIVE  POWERS 
Under the Treaties of Rome, Parliament's in-
volvement  in  the  legislative  process  was 
restricted  to  giving  its  opinion on  certain 
·Commission  proposals.  In  addition to this 
compulsory  consultation,  provision  was 
later made for optional consultation at there-
quest  of the  Council,  with the  result  that 
Parliament now makes its voice heard in the 
legislative  process  whenever  major  legis-
lation is involved. 
However, Parliament was not satisfied with 
this  consultative  role  (even  less  so  once it became  an  elected  body).  By  using  its 
budgetary powers it first endeavoured to ob-
tain a greater say in the legislative activities of 
the Community. The introduction in 1975 of 
a  conciliation  procedure  between  Par-
liament,  the  Commission  and  the  Council 
should  have  strengthened  Parliament's 
influence on the drafting of legislation with 
significant  budgetary  implications.  So  far, 
however, the procedure has not been  really 
effective. 
Parliament's  stated  objective  since  direct 
elections  is  that the  power to  enact  legis-
lation should be shared between Parliament 
and  the  Council.  Not unreasonably,  MEPs 
sec such  reform as the surest way of giving 
Parliament some influence in the running of 
the  Community  and  of  making  its  voice 
heard  publicly.  The  low  turnout  in 
successive  elections  emphasized  the  need 
for such a change. 
Thus, before its dissolution, the first directly 
elected  Parliament  adopted  a draft  Treaty 
establishing the  European  Union, initiated 
by  Alticro  Spinelli,  which  aimed  at  a 
thorough overhaul of  the Community system 
to enable the Communities to overcome the 
obstacles  they  faced  and  to  move  forward 
with  renewed  impetus.  It  also  sought  to 
reform  the  Community's  system  of  legis-
lation by giving Parliament and the Council 
an  equal say in decisions. 
Parliament's  initiative  was  instrumental  in 
prompting awareness of the need to reform 
the institutions and to set clear objectives for 
the  Community,  and  (as  has  already  been 
pointed out) led both to the decision to com-
plete the internal market by 1992 and to the 
convening  of the  Intergovernmental  Con-
ference which drafted the Single European 
Act. 
While it docs  not  give  Parliament  all  the 
legislative powers it wanted, the Single Act 
docs  confer  on  it the  power of assent  -
essentially a joint decision-making power-
in  relation  to  accession  and  agreements 
~  Strasbourg, plenary session of  the European Parliament under Article 238  EEC  (e.g.  association and 
cooperation agreements with the Mediterra-
nean countries, the Lome Convention, etc.). 
Secondly,  it introduces a cooperation  pro-
cedure applicable to qualified majority deci-
sions  having  a  bearing  on  the  internal 
market,  social  policy, economic and  social 
cohesion and research. This procedure can 
be summarized as  follows: 
(i)  The  Council,  on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission and after obtaining the opi-
nion of Parliament,  adopts  a 'common 
position'. This  is  then referred to Parlia-
ment, which has three months in which 
to endorse it (expressly or implicitly), re-
ject it or amend it. The Commission has 
one month in which to decide whether 
or not to accept any  amendments pro-
posed  by Parliament. 
(ii)  The Council then proceeds to a second 
reading. 
(iii) If Parliament has  rejected the Council's 
'common  position',  unanimity  is  re-
quired.  If  Parliament  has  proposed 
amendments,  the  Council  votes  by 
qualified  majority where the  Commis-
sion has endorsed them and unanimous-
ly  where  the  Commission  has  been 
unable to do so. 
(iv) If the  Council fails  to reach  a decision 
within  three  months,  the  Commission 
proposal  is  deemed  not to  have  been 
adopted. 
While the Commission remains the driving 
force behind the drafting of legislation, this 
procedure  gives  Parliament  a  direct  in-
fluence on decisions, even  though the final 
word still rests  with the Council. 
Parliament  has  been  very  critical  of  the 
cooperation  procedure,  deeming  it  to  be 
most unsatisfactory. 
At the same time, it has decided to use every 
possibility open to it to make its voice heard 
in the legislative process. 
It  has  therefore  amended  its  rules  of pro-
cedure and changed the way it organizes its 
business  in order to comply with the time-
limits laid down under the new procedure 
and  to obtain the  required  majority in the 
second  reading  (absolute  majority  of 
members entitled to sit in the House). These 
changes  have ensured that the cooperation 
procedure functions smoothly: between the 
entry into force of  the Single Act and the end 
of 1989, 112 acts were adopted under the pro-
cedure. 
Parliament's  intervention  has  proved  effec-
tive. A high percentage of its amendments-
some  of them  of great  significance - are 
adopted by the Commission and the Council 
between  the  two  readings.  Parliament 
nowadays has a real influence on the making 
of Community legislation. 
The combination of  the two reforms brought 
in by the Single Act- majority voting in the 
Council and  the cooperation procedure -
has at last had the effect of speeding up the 
legislative process. 
Parliament  regards  the  cooperation  pro-
cedure as merely a step towards the wielding 
of real  legislative power. At the forthcoming 
intergovernmental conferences it intends to 
propose that, at the very least,  it be granted 
real  joint decision-making powers with the 
Council. 
Regarding  the  conclusion  of cooperation 
agreements,  Parliament  immediately  sig-
nalled  its  intention to make  full  use  of its 
newly gained power of assent by refusing to 
be hurried into votes and by requesting full 
participation  in  drawing  up  negotiating 
briefs  as  well  as  in  the  negotiations 
themselves. THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
Because  of the  substantial  direct  enforce-
ment powers vested  in the  High Authority 
under the  ECSC  Treaty,  the  ECSC  Court of 
Justice was mainly called upon to handle ap-
peals to  it by coal  and  steel  enterprises.  In 
1958 the Rome Treaties replaced it by a single 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Com-
munities.  Since  application  of the  Rome 
Treaties, and the EEC Treaty in particular, call-
ed for a considerable measure of  government 
action, the first cases coming before the new 
Court  were  brought  by  the  Commission 
against governments for infringements of  the 
Treaties. These were followed in due course 
by actions  brought by governments against 
decisions  of the  Commission  and  actions 
brought by individuals. 
The Court's procedure for dealing with cases 
of this kind is  broadly similar to that of the 
highest  courts  of appeal  in  the  Member 
States. Its judgments not only settle the par-
ticular matters at issue, but also spell out the 
construction  to  be  placed  on  disputed 
passages  in  the  Treaties,  thereby  affording 
clarification  and  guidance  as  to  their  im-
plementation. 
In recent years, over and above this function 
of ensuring  that  Community  legislation  is 
good  law,  the Court has  increasingly been 
called  upon to give preliminary rulings on 
questions  referred  to  it by  national  courts. 
Community law, made up ofthe  Treaties and 
the  corpus  of  legislation  based  on  them 
(secondary  legislation),  is  becoming more 
and more interwoven with the national law 
of the individual member countries.  Its  im-
plementation  is  therefore  attracting  more 
and  more of the  national courts' attention. 
(g)  The Court of  Justice of  the European Communities (Centre europeen, Luxembourg) Several thousand decisions have been taken 
by national courts under the EEC and  ECSC 
Treaties (but none under the Euratom Treaty 
because of its special structure). 
Referrals to the Court of justice are requests 
to it to rule on the interpretation or to assess 
the  validity of particular portions of Com-
munity law (in the ECSC context, the validity 
of Commission and Council legislation on-
ly). The steady  rise  in the number of such 
referrals bears witness to the closer working 
cooperation  between  the  European  Court 
and national courts, permitting Community 
law  to  be  uniformly  enforced  in  all  the 
member countries and helping to build up a 
consistent body of European case-law. 
A few figures may serve to indicate the extent 
ofthe Court of  Justice's work. Between 1952, 
when the ECSC Treaty came into force, and 
the end of 1989,  4265  cases  were brought 
(this  figure excludes administrative actions 
by Community officials in connection with 
the  Staff  Regulations).  Of this  total,  3  711 
related to the EEC Treaty: of  these 2 061 were 
preliminary  rulings  (including  72  actions 
brought under the Brussels  Convention on 
Jurisdiction  and  the  Enforcement  of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial matters), 
739  were actions by  the Commission,  158 
were actions by governments, 27 were by in-
stitutions against another institution and 747 
were actions by individuals. Of  the 537 ECSC 
cases  brought between 1952 and  1989 499 
were  instituted  by  individuals  and  enter-
prises,  31  by  governments  and  five  were 
preliminary  rulings.  Twenty  actions,  of 
which three were preliminary rulings, have 
been brought with respect to Euratom. 
A  Court of First  Instance  was  established 
under the Single European Act. It took up its 
duties in October 1989 and has jurisdiction 
in actions relating to matters covered by the 
ECSC  Treaty,  enforcement  of the  rules  on 
competition and disputes between the Com-
munity institutions and  their staff.  Appeals 
against its decisions may be brought before 
the Court of justice, in which case the latter 
may  deliver a judgment only on  points of 
law. THE  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
The  Economic and  Social  Committee pro-
vides  institutional  representation  for  the 
various  categories  of economic and  social 
activity:  employers,  workers  and  interest 
groups covering the other forms of activity, 
including agriculture, transport, commerce, 
crafts, the professions, small businesses, con-
sumer affairs, protection of the environment 
and cooperatives, are all represented on the 
Committee. 
The  Committee  has  189  Members  drawn 
from  the  most  representative  national 
organizations; they are appointed in a per-
sonal  capacity  by  the  Council  (after  con-
sulting the Commission) for a term of four 
years. 
Members  are  divided  into  three  groups: 
Employers,  Workers,  and  Various  Interests. 
Opinions delivered  in  plenary session  are 
drawn  up  by  specialized  sections,  whose 
members may be accompanied at meetings 
by assistants appointed as experts. 
Instituted by the Treaties of Rome, the Com-
mittee has to be consulted by the Council on 
Commission  proposals  in  certain  areas 
specified in the EEC and Euratom Treaties. It 
also delivers opinions at the request of the 
Council  or the  Commission  and  - since 
1972 -on its own initiative. 
The  Committee  also  cooperates  with  the 
European Parliament along the lines set out 
in a resolution adopted by Parliament on 9 
July  1981,  which provides for the organiza-
tion  of exchanges  of information  between 
parliamentary  committees  and  specialized 
sections  as  well  as  for  liaison  between 
chairmen and  rapporteurs. 
The activities of  the Committee have increas-
ed steadily (from seven opinions in 1968 to 
nearly 180 in 1989). In most cases, the Com-
mittee  reaches  a  consensus  on  opinions 
which are an amalgam of  the positions of  the 
various  groups  and  as  such  are  of con-
siderable value to the Commission and the 
Council,  highlighting  as  they  do  the 
desiderata of  the groups most affected by the 
proposal. Some of the Committee's own-in-
itiative opinions have been of major political 
importance;  a  particular  example  was  its 
opinion of  22 February 1989 on fundamental 
social  rights in the Community, which pro-
vided  the  basis  for the  Commission's  pro-
posal for a 'Social Charter' (accepted by 11  of 
the Member States). 
The Single European  Act has  increased the 
involvement of  the Committee in the drafting 
of texts relating to completion of the single 
market. And the  role  of the  Committee  is 
destined to increase further with the advent 
of the single market and  of economic and 
monetary union in that it will be responsible 
for ensuring that those involved in business 
and commerce and the two sides of industry 
play a part in the  implementation of these 
major ventures and in progress towards Euro-
pean  Union in general. THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
The Court of  Auditors was set up by the Trea-
ty of 22  july 1975  and  held  its  constituent 
meeting  in  Luxembourg  (its  provisional 
headquarters) on 25 October 1977. 
The  Court  took  over  from  the  EEC  and 
Euratom  Audit  Board  and  from  the  ECSC 
Auditor as  the  body in  charge  of external 
auditing of  the Community's general budget 
and  the  ECSC's  operating budget.  Internal 
auditing is still a matter for each institution's 
financial controller. 
In setting up the court the governments and 
institutions (particularly Parliament) showed 
that they wanted a qualitative change in the 
style of budgetary auditing, given the steady 
increase  in  the  size  of the  Community's 
budget. Not only does the Court have more 
political authority than its predecessors, but, 
more important still, it is a permanent body 
with a relatively large staff.  It can extend its 
investigations  to  operations  carried  out in 
and  by the Member States on behalf of the 
Community  (such  as  expenditure  on 
agriculture  or  the  collection  of  customs 
duties) and in non-member countries which 
receive  Community  aid  (under  the  Lome 
Convention  for  example).  It  can  address 
observations on its own initiative to the in-
stitutions on operations undertaken by them 
and  it can deliver opinions at the request of 
an  institution. 
At the end of each  financial year the Court 
draws up a report on its work. This is publish-
ed  in  the  Official journal with the  institu-
tions' replies to its observations. In addition 
to this, it produces a large number of special 
reports on individual and sometimes major 
issues  (e.g.  the  operation  of the  EAGGF 
Guarantee Section or food aid to developing 
countries). 
Parliament,  which had  attached enormous 
importance to the establishment of  a Court of 
Auditors, makes full use of the opportunities 
offered by the Court's investigatory powers, 
opinions and  annual  report to reinforce its 
own control  over Community expenditure 
and  give full weight to its  annual decision 
granting a discharge in respect of implemen-
tation of the Community budget. WORKING METHODS 
From this brief account of the main tasks of 
the  institutions,  their  relationship  to  each 
other and the balance of powers  between 
them,  let  us  now  turn  to  their  working 
methods. 
[] THE COMMISSION'S 
DEPARTMENTS 
The Commission's departments comprise a 
Secretariat-General,  a  Legal  Service,  a 
Statistical  Office,  23  Directorates-General, 
and a small number of specialized services. 
In  December 1990 the staff totalled 12 983, 
of whom 3 599 arc in administrative and ex-
ecutive grades. Another 1 499 are engaged in 
translation and interpretation. There are nine 
official  Community  languages,  hence  the 
size of the Language Service. 
Officials are divided between the two provi-
sional  places of work of the institutions  in 
Brussels and Luxembourg (more than 2 600 
based in  Luxembourg). Around 2 800 other 
staff are engaged in  research work;  most of 
them are assigned to the Joint Research Cen-
tre's institutes. 
In  1990  administrative expenditure  by  the 
Commission and the three other institutions 
was in the region of ECU  2 360 million, or 
4.8% of the total  budget. 
Each of the Members of the Commission has 
been given special responsibility for one or 
more portfolios or broad areas of Communi-
ty  activity  (external  relations,  agriculture, 
social  affairs,  etc.).  He  has  one  or  more 
Directors-General reporting to him. 
[]HOW THE COMMISSION 
WORKS 
Underthe Treaties, the Commission is bound 
to act collectively. This means that the Com-
mission, as a body,  must adopt the various 
measures  - regulations,  decisions,  pro-
posals to the Council, etc.- incumbent on 
it under the Treaties or implementing regula-
tions. It cannot delegate powers to a Member 
in his particular area which would give him 
a measure of independence comparable to 
that enjoyed by, say a national minister in his 
department. 
Various  procedural  devices  have  been 
adopted to ensure that this system does not 
create  log-jams  in  Commission  business. 
Discussion of particularly important or com-
plex matters is prepared by ad hoc groups of 
the Members most concerned. 
The  Commissioners'  chefs  de  cabinet  or 
other members of their staff meet regularly to 
prepare  the  ground  for  the  Commission's 
discussions  and  simplify  decision-making 
either by considering matters of a particular-
ly technical nature in depth or, at the start of 
each week, by discussing all the items on the 
agenda  for  the  Commission's  weekly 
meeting. 
Straightforward matters are largely dealt with 
by  'written procedure', a device taken  over 
from the EEC Commission: the Members are 
sent the dossier and the proposal for a deci-
sion, and  if they  have  not entered  reserva-
tions  or objections  within  a  given  period 
(usually one week) the proposal is deemed to 
be adopted. 
The written procedure was used 1 758 times 
in 1989. 
Lastly, the Commission can empower one of 
its  Members  to  take  decisions  on  routine 
matters on  its  behalf and under its  respon-
sibility.  Powers  are  delegated  only  if  the 
margin  of  discretion  is  narrow  and  no 
political issues are involved. Many recurrent 
agricultural  regulations  are adopted  under 
this  procedure.  In  1989  about  11  120 
measures were taken  in this way. 
Only matters of some importance actually 
appear on the agenda for the Commission's 
weekly meeting, which usually lasts at least 
one day. When particularly delicate matters are being 
discussed,  the Commission  sits  alone,  the 
only  official  present  being  the  Secretary-
General. 
In other cases, the officials responsible may 
be called in. Although its decisions can be 
taken  by  a  majority,  many  are  in  fact 
unanimous.  Where  a  vote  is  taken,  the 
minority  abides  by  the  majority  decision, 
which becomes the position of the full Com-
mission. 
D HOW THE COMMISSION 
REACHES  ITS  DECISIONS AND 
DRAWS  UP  PROPOSALS  FOR 
SUBMISSION TO THE 
COUNCIL 
The Commission proceeds quite differently 
depending on whether its aim is to establish 
the broad outlines of the policy it intends to 
pursue in a particular field, or to define the 
practical  details of that policy or measures 
which tend more towards the technical than 
the political. 
When it  is formulating policy, the Commis-
sion, following extensive consultations with 
political  circles,  top  civil  servants  and 
employers'  and  workers'  organizations, 
works  out  its  final  position  with  the 
assistance of  its  own departments. This  in-
volves a series of meetings, often numerous 
and prolonged, with a period of careful con-
sideration  between  one  reading  and  the 
next.  It is along these lines, for instance, that 
the Commission prepared its opinions on ap-
plications  for  Community  membership,  its 
annual farm  price proposals,  its  reports on 
reform  of  the  common  agricultural  policy 
and  the structural  Funds,  its  proposals on 
new own resources and documents such as 
its White Paper on completing the internal 
market and the 1987 package, 'Making a suc-
cess of the Single Act'. 
By  contrast, once the main  lines  of policy 
have been agreed, the Commission normally 
consults  national  experts  to  work  out the 
practical  details  of  arrangements  to  be 
adopted or proposals to be submitted. The 
Commission's  departments  convene 
meetings of government experts at which a 
Commission  official  takes the chair.  These 
experts  do  not  commit  their  respective 
governments, but as they are sufficiently well 
informed as to the latter's wishes and general 
position, they can guide their Commission 
counterparts  in  their  search  for  suitable 
technical formulas which will  be generally 
acceptable to the governments. 
As  these  meetings  of  experts  proliferate, 
more and  more  national  civil  servants  are 
receiving what can fairly  be called a Euro-
pean training. 
At  the  same  time,  a  departmental-level 
dialogue is being conducted between Com-
munity  and  national  officials.  In  addition, 
Members of the Commission or their depart-
ments  have  regular  meetings  with  leading 
representatives of trade unions,  employers' 
federations,  farmers'  associations,  traders' 
organizations,  etc.,  grouped  at  European 
level. 
Some committees have been formally institu-
tionalized  by  the Council  or Commission. 
Examples  of this  are  the  Economic  Policy 
Committee, the Committee for Scientific and 
Technical Research, the agricultural advisory 
committees  and  the  Consumers'  Con-
sultative Council. Some ofthese committees 
comprise high-level  government  represent-
atives,  others  bring  together  leading 
members  of  the  professional  and  trade 
associations concerned. Still  others  have  a 
mixed  membership of government experts 
and delegates from the interest groups con-
cerned. 
In due course the results ofthese preparatory 
proceedings are laid before the Commission, 
which then adopts its position. This, then, is 
the  process  by  which  the  Commission 
frames not only its proposals to the Council, 
but also regulations or decisions which it  is 
responsible  for  itself,  but  which  it  thinks 
preferable to  prepare with  the help of  na-
tional civil service expertise. D THE COUNCIL IN 
OPERATION 
When  it  receives  a  general  policy  paper 
('memorandum') or a specific proposal from 
the Commission, the Council refers it to the 
Permanent  Representatives  Committee 
(there  is,  however,  a special  committee for 
agriculture). The ground for the Committee's 
deliberations is prepared by a host of work-
ing parties or committees, some of  which are 
permanent. 
The  Commission  is  represented  at  all 
meetings of the Permanent Representatives 
Committee,  special  committees  and  work-
ing parties so that the dialogue begun with 
national  experts  can  continue  with  am-
bassadors and government representatives. 
The Council's decisions must be taken by the 
Ministers themselves.  However, on less  im-
portant  matters,  decisions  are  adopted 
without debate if the Permanent Represent-
atives and  the Commission's representative 
are unanimously agreed. This procedure has 
been extended to certain decisions adopted 
by  a qualified majority where the  delega-
tions in the minority do not request that the 
matter be debated in the Council. 
By contrast, important questions and issues 
with political implications are discussed in 
detail by the Ministers and the Members of 
the  Commission,  who  attend  Council 
meetings as of right. It is at this stage that the 
dialogue described earlier comes into play. 
Council meetings are  not mere formalities, 
as ministerial meetings in other international 
organizations  sometimes  are.  They  are 
down-to-earth  working sessions  of serious 
and  sometimes  heated  debate,  where  the 
outcome may hang in the balance until the 
very last. They are, incidentally, frequent and 
often lengthy. 
In  1989,  the Council held  89  meetings  in-
cluding the two European Councils. The Per-
manent Representatives Committee met 44 
times. 
When a decision has to be taken on a par-
ticularly thorny issue, the Council may have 
to hold a 'marathon' session.  Brussels  still 
remembers the marathon on the agricultural 
market mechanisms at the end of 1961  and 
beginning  of  1962.  This  meeting,  which 
lasted  nearly three weeks after the Council 
'stopped  the  clock'  holds  the  record,  but 
there have been others  ... 
This, then, is how the Council, the Commis-
sion, and the Community in general operate. 
To sum up, three points might be made about 
the institutions' approach. 
Firstly, the institutions, and the Commission 
in particular, do not live in an ivory tower. On 
the contrary, they provide an open forum for exchanges  of views  between  governments 
and civil services, Members of the European 
Parliament  and  representatives  of  interest 
groups in different sectors of the economy. 
Secondly, although strict legal rules must be 
faithfully obeyed, the necessary flexibility is 
guaranteed by the constant dialogue which 
creates a team spirit and fosters mutual con-
fidence. 
Last but not least, economic interest groups, 
Parliament,  national  civil  services  and 
Ministers  have  genuine  confidence  in  the 
Commission's impartiality. 
The EEC and Euratom have been in existence 
for more than 30 years now; the ECSC even 
longer. After several crises and the accession 
of six new Member States, it can be said that 
the  Community  system  has  proved  its 
durability. 
Through its institutions the Community has 
succeeded in attaining many of the Treaties' 
objectives, and in some areas it has progress-
ed  even  further.  But integration remains  in-
complete,  and  worse  still,  unbalanced. 
Substantial  progress  must  still  be  made, 
otherwise ground will be lost. 
The 1969 Hague Summit of the six Heads of 
State or Government gave birth to two major 
plans:  economic and  monetary union and 
greater political solidarity. At the prompting 
of  Pierre  Werner,  the  Luxembourg  Prime 
Minister, an ambitious project for economic 
union was presented to the national govern-
ments,  but progress  towards it was  slowed 
and eventually halted by the economic crisis 
of the 1970s. 
Then, in the autumn of 1977, the President of 
the  Commission  relaunched  the  idea  of 
monetary union. Following initiatives by  a 
number of  governments and by the Commis-
sion itself, and thanks to the active efforts of 
the  European  Council,  the  European 
Monetary  System  came  into  effect  on  13 
March 1979, with eight Member States as full 
participants. 
At present Greece and  Portugal do not take 
part  in  the  exchange-rate  mechanism 
although  their  currencies  are  part  of the 
'basket' of  currencies that makes up the ecu. 
The operation of the EMS  has strengthened 
monetary  cooperation  remarkably:  ex-
change rates have become a matter of  mutual 
interest  and  any  changes  (devaluation  or 
revaluation) are discussed and agreed jointly 
at  special  meetings  of  Finance  Ministers. 
This  has  also  led  to  increased  economic 
discipline and greater harmonization of the 
economic policies of the Member States. 
In today's world, economic solidarity is  in-
separable  from  political  solidarity.  In  this 
respect, the conclusions of the Hague Sum-
mit did have a tangible impact: a system  of 
political  cooperation  was  brought  into 
operation by the governments of  the Member 
States. This has been gradually extended to 
almost every area of  foreign policy, including 
the political and economic aspects of securi-
ty,  and  was  made  legally  binding  by  the 
Single European Act. It operates on a consen-
sual basis. Although it has its own structures, 
it now functions in close harmony with the 
Community institutions. Its President reports 
regularly to Parliament and the Commission 
is involved in all meetings. It has enabled the 
Member States to speak with one voice on 
subjects such as East-West relations, the Mid-
dle East  conflict,  Cyprus,  Central  America 
and southern Africa. 
Greece applied for membership of the Com-
munity in  1975,  following the  end  of the 
military dictatorship, and  became the  10th 
member  on  1  january  1981.  The  newly 
returned  democratic  governments  in  Por-
tugal  and  Spain  applied in March and july 
1977  respectively  and  negotiations  with 
them opened in October 1978 and February 
1979. These were finally concluded in 1985, 
and the two countries joined the Community 
on 1 january 1986. 
But  whether these  developments,  together 
with the setting up of the European Council 
and the introduction of direct Parliamentary 
elections, have given any more substance to 
the desire expressed by the Heads of State or 
Government in 1972 to see the relationship 
between the Member States transformed into 
a European Union by the end of the decade 
is another question. The worsening situation 
in the Community at  the beginning of the 1980s contrasted sharply with this declared 
ambition. 
The  deepening  crisis  prompted  a  sudden 
political reawakening, bearing witness to the 
deep roots of  the movement for European in-
tegration  and  finding expression  in  Parlia-
ment's  adoption  of  the  draft  Treaty 
establishing  European  Union  - the  so-
called Spinelli draft- in February 1984 and 
the negotiation of the Single European  Act 
which entered into force on 1 july 1987. The 
Community thereby set itself a goal of enor-
mous economic, political and psychological 
significance-the completion of  a single in-
ternal market by the end of 1992-and at the 
same  time  introduced  the  substantial  im-
provements  to  its  institutional  workings 
which we have already mentioned (majority 
voting in the Council, the cooperation pro-
cedure between Parliament, the Council and 
the  Commission  and  the  consolidation  of 
political cooperation). 
The completion of the single market- in-
cluding freedom to move capital unhindered 
- and  the  demand  for  closer  economic 
cohesion between the Member States, both 
formally  enshrined  in the  Single  Act,  will 
give the Community a 'dynamic imbalance', 
which was described by jean Monnet in the 
1950s as a major factor in European integra-
tion.  This  explains  the  decision  by  the 
Hanover European Council in june 1988 to 
take the first steps on the road to economic 
and monetary union and the convening of  an 
intergovernmental conference in December 
1990 to negotiate the relevant amendments 
to the Treaties. 
This  economic  revival  warrants  pursuing 
other ambitions, such as the aspiration for a 
common policy on foreign affairs and secu-
rity,  the  need  for  which  has  been 
demonstrated  very  clearly  by  the  revolu-
tionary events in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the end of the Cold War (not to mention the Gulf  crisis which began in the summer of 
1990). This issue will be discussed at a sec-
ond Intergovernmental Conference which is 
to work alongside the one on economic and 
monetary union and, we must hope, in close 
relation  to  it.  The  conference  should  also 
lead to a further strengthening of the institu-
tions,  bringing  us  closer  to  a  European 
government and making the workings of the 
Community  more  democratic.  Will  the 
Twelve  be  prepared to commit themselves 
wholeheartedly  in  all  these  areas  or will 
another framework have to be found or  other 
approaches tried? It remains to be seen, but 
in today's new international context the im-
portant thing is that the Community must-
as  one  former  President  of the  European 
Council put it-stop 'getting bogged down 
in petty squabbles that make it lose sight of 
its purpose' and must reassert its determina-
tion to serve as the grand design of  the States 
and peoples of Europe. European Communities- Commission 
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